Active cultural transmission of fitness-enhancing behavior can be seen as a costly strategy, one whose evolutionary stability poses a Darwinian puzzle. In this article, we o↵er a biological market model of cultural transmission that substitutes or complements existing kin-selection based theories for the evolution of cultural capacities. We explicitly formulate how a biological market can account for the evolution of deference and prestige-related phenomena, as well as how it can a↵ect the dynamics of cumulative culture. We show that, under certain conditions, teaching evolves even when innovations are not su ciently opaque and can be acquired by emulators via inadvertent transmission. Furthermore, teaching in a biological market is a precondition for enhanced individual learning abilities.
individuals with strategy I at time t + 1 will be n I ⇥W I P j n j ⇥W j . Such an idealiza-114 tion represents either the result of genetic evolution in an haploid panmictic 115 asexual population or the dynamics resulting from social learning focused on 116 the relative success of other strategies in the population. 117 In the simplest preliminary form of that scenario, a part of the popula- dividual learning also yields a benefit ↵. To simplify, we suppose here that 124 4 agents who learn individually always discover an innovation of fitness value who can learn socially from a given individual learner. That condition is 141 ecologically plausible, at least for a wide range of learning processes used to 142 acquire certain techniques. Furthermore, it is easy to imagine that only a 143 finite number of agents can have access to a given individual learner for the 144 behavior to be adopted 1 . 145 The average fitness of an agent who learns socially is then dependent of 146 the frequency of those who learn individually and that by the following rule:
where freq X is the proportion of strategy X in the population (I for   148 individual learning, S for social learning), and M in denotes a selection of the 149 minimal value between 1 and the e↵ective proportion of emulators that can 150 acquire the behavior given the number of individual learners in the population 151 N p ⇥ freq I /f req S .
152
If N p ⇥ freq I > freq S , then all emulators can find a model to copy 153 1 Mathematically, this condition helps to prevent singularities: without it, a single learning agent su ces in order for all social learners in a large population to be able to acquire the innovation (N pop 1). However, the number of social learners would abruptly collapse (and become 0) when the proportion of individual learners decreases from 1/N pop to 0. It is not incoherent to state that social learning is facilitated when the proportion of individual learners in the population is greater.
and their fitness will therefore equal W S = W 0 + f ⇥ ↵. In the opposite case, certain emulators can learn from a model but not all of them. The 155 probability of learning socially is then
then the individual learning strategy is always more advantageous than the 157 social learning one. At the same time, if f ⇥ ↵ > ↵ a, then the number of 158 social learners will tend to increase until f ⇥ ↵ ⇥ N p ⇥ freq I /f req S = ↵ a , 159 that is, to the point at which both strategies have the same fitness. At that 160 equilibrium, it is the case that:
3. Model 2: Teaching in a biological market learner. This is why there can be a market, the individual learners o↵ering a 167 privileged access to their skills ("selling") in exchange for biological services.
168
To introduce the possibility of teaching, we assume that agents who learn 169 individually -with a frequency in the population freq I -can also follow a 170 strategy by which they actively teach the acquisition of their technique. In 171 addition to the cost of individual learning a, such a strategy will have a cost 172 t linked to teaching. As with the previous model, we assume that there is a 173 maximum N t of individuals who can at once learn from a single teacher as 174 "apprentices 2 ".
175
Another assumption of our model is that social learners who acquire the 176 technique directly from the teacher will reproduce a perfectly e cacious copy 177 of the teacher's innovation. Although admittedly an idealization, the point 178 is simply that, for this modality of technological learning, social learning 179 without a teacher sometimes tends to produce a less fit solution than were 180 there a teacher-apprenticeship relationship. Thus, if there is a teacher, then 181 the fitness value of the socially learned technique becomes ↵ instead of f ⇥ ↵.
However, individuals who learn socially from a teacher will recompense the teacher via deference and prestige mechanisms that have a cost m and that 184 return m ⇥ g to the teacher. It seems reasonable to assume that most of the 185 time g > 1, however our model does not strictly depend on that assumption.
186
For deference to evolve in social learning, its cost m must be less than 187 the cost of individual learning a. Consequently, at its greatest value m is 188 equal to a. For the evolution of teaching, the cost t of teaching thus has to 189 be inferior to N t ⇥ g ⇥ a.
190
Calculating the equilibrium state of the system is not straightforward, as 191 both freq S relative to freq I and the value of m may evolve. Additionally, it 192 could be that not all the individual have the same preference m.
193
One method is to look at the evolution of the frequencies and of m in-194 dependently. We can start assuming that all the individuals in a population 195 have a fixed preference m. We can write the fitness values for the teach-196 ers and apprentices and obtain their equilibrium frequencies for which their 197 fitnesses are equal. Then, we assume that the frequencies are fixed, the 198 whole population has still this preference m, except that there are mutants.
199
If N t freq I < freq S , not all apprentices are matched with a teacher, and 200 thus a mutant apprentice with a slightly higher m will be favored, and thus 201 the preference m of the apprentices will evolve towards higher values, thus 202 allowing the preference of the teachers m to also evolve towards higher val- were such that apprentices and teachers had the same fitness. If m increases 208 (respectively decreases), then teachers are less (respectively more) fit that 209 apprentices, then the teacher's frequency decreases (resp. increases). Thus 210 the equilibrium point is:
which is equivalent to:
and:
in which m eq is the value of m at equilibrium.
By extension, another condition for the evolution of teaching is that ↵ > the cost of deference. That condition is really constraining for teaching only 217 at very high values of a or t. It is most reasonable that g is at least equal to 218 1, and N t at least equal to 1. Thus for instance, if a and t remain less costly 219 than ↵, then that condition is filled.
220
An interesting property of m eq is that it is the m value maximizing the 221 fitness of the population (see appendix). The evolutionary stable equilibrium 222 is also the state of the system with the highest fitness. In our model, the 223 so-called Rogers' paradox (Aoki and Feldman, 2014) does not occur. 224 We considered here that all social learners have the same preference m, 
Even if deference is relatively costly, the apprentice strategy can be on par 239 with the emulator strategy, because it enables a better access to individual 240 learners who are a source of innovation. In fact, both strategies could still 241 coexist with f = 1 -albeit the larger f , the smaller the frequency of the 242 apprentice strategy. As a result, the assumption that f < 1 is not necessary. Teaching and emulating f > 1 meq
Individual learning only f < 1 a ↵ No m freq I = 1 reproduced, preferences of teachers and apprentices cannot be exactly equal, 248 because a mutation towards a slightly higher m for a teacher or a slightly 249 lower m for an apprentice would lead to the inability to enter in a teaching 250 relationship, thus decreasing the second-generation fitness.
251
To check that the system converges towards our analytical results, we 
Results

273
As confirmed by the numerical simulations, there are four di↵erent regimes, 274 as summarized in table 1. Teaching is a stable strategy if the cost of teach-275 ing t is smaller than N t ⇥ g ⇥ a. Teaching is clearly facilitated when there 276 are more potential apprentices (N t ) (Table 1 and supplementary figure 2) , 277 receiving deference provides a higher gain (g) ( Table 1 and value (1 f )↵ is smaller than the cost of retributing a teacher (m eq ) if there 284 is teaching (Table 1 and figure 2C ), or smaller than the cost of learning the 285 technique individually (a) if there is no teaching (Table 1 and supplementary 286 figure 7) .
287
In the case of teaching, the value of the deference m at equilibrium in-288 creases with a, t, and decreases with N t and g : deference has to be higher 289 to o↵set a higher cost of individual learning and teaching, and the higher 290 the number of apprentices per teacher and the higher the factor g, the less 291 the deference cost per apprentice (table 1 and (table 1 and figure 2A) . 299 Another result is that, under a biological market of the type described 300 here, for individual learning to be beneficial, it is su cient that the cost of 301 individual learning a is smaller than ↵ ⇥ (N t g + 1) t, which, except when 302 t is large and N t is small, is likely much larger than ↵. Hence, there are 303 investments in skills for which benefits would not be su cient in themselves, Previous research has shown that social learning per se does not auto-308 matically lead to cumulative culture, that is, sustained evolution of ever 309 increasingly adaptive cultural techniques (Enquist and Ghirlanda, 2007 ). In 310 model 2, we have shown that the market for deference and prestige supports 311 increased costs of innovations. Accordingly, we believe that taking those 312 sorts of biological markets seriously can shed light on ecological forces active 313 in the evolution of cumulative culture.
314
Until now, we have considered the skill to be fixed. Here, however, we 315 consider a di↵erent model, in which the skill of value ↵ can be improved by 316 ↵ with probability ✏ when e↵ort r is invested into innovation. We consider figure 1 ), and errors-bars represent the standard deviation. Theoretical curves : m (5) (solid purple lines), freq I with teachers, apprentices, and emulators (6) (dashed blue), with teachers and apprentices only (4) (dot-dashed blue), with individual learners and emulators only (2) (dotted blue). For all the simulations, the population is taken as 200 individuals, with the base fitness W 0 = 0.01, the technique benefit ↵ = 1, the typical mutational change on m m = 0.02, and when the interaction happens, m is taken as the average between the preferences of the two individuals (coef share = 0.5). Initially 50% of the population are individual learners, with for all individuals, m taken at random between 0 and 1. Except if stated otherwise, the other parameters are N t = 2, N p = 3, a = 0.8, t = 0.5, f = 1, g = 1. Panel A: dependence on N t . Panel B: dependence on N p (t = 0.1, f = 0.9). Panel C: dependence on f (t = 0.1). For panels A, B and C, freq I in simulations is represented by triangles, and m in simulations is represented by a filled circle when there are exchanges in all the points used for computing the average values, and an empty circle when there are points for which there has not been any exchanges (but at least for half the points; m values for which there are exchanges in less than half the simulation points are not represented). Pannel D: as the dependence of freq I on t, g and a is predicted to occur only through the value of m when there are teachers, apprentices and emulators, we represent the values of m and freq I as a function of the predicted m for the points predicted to be within this regime. Supplementary figures 3, 4 and 5 show the dependence for each parameter individually.
wheras the "oldest" individual dies. The entrance can represent either a
